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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SOUTHEAST FURNITURE and 
ST A TJ1J INSURANCE FTTND, 
Plaintiff s-AppeUants, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and DEAN L. BARRETT, 
Def enrhmts-Respondents. 




'rhis action is based upon a claim by defendant, 
Dean L. Barrett, for compensation for injuries sustained 
in the course of his employment, pursnant to the provi-
sions of Title 35, Chaptf'r 1, \Vorkmen's Compensation. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 'rHE 
TNDTTSTRIAL 
The Industrial Commi:'lsion concluded that "the 
applicant [was] entitled to workmen's compensation 
henefits as a result of an accidf'nt arising out of or in 
the course of his employment hy the [Plaintiff South East 
Furniture Company]." 
2 
RELIFJF 80UGH11 ON APPEAL 
The Defendant submits that the ruling of the In-
dm;trial Commission should he affirnwd. 
On November 10, 1966, defendant Barrett was driv-
ing his automobile in the Yicinity of Tooele, Ptah, pursu-
ant to his l:'mployment with plaintiff, 8onth East Furni-
ture. At about the hour of 10 :80 o'clock A.l\I. Barrett's 
automohih" was invol\'Pd in an accifh·nt with anothPr anto-
mohilt>, which accident was determint>d not to he his 
fault. (R. 12G) As a rt>snlt of the accident, Barrett suf-
fered extl:'nsi\'e neck injuries and abrasion and pmwtnn• 
wounds. (R. 1, R. R. 12G) 
Barn_.tt suhsequf'ntly fi lt>d a claim for workmen's 
eorn1wnsation. ( R. 8) rrlw Stat<-> T nsnrancP Fund, whie11 
was tl1<-> 'y orknwn 's Compensation 1 nsnrauc(' carriPr of 
BarrPtf s employer, paid nwdical <'Xpf'nsPs in tlw amonnt 
of $271.00 and corn1wnsation in the amount of $:3+G.25 
(R. 10), hut denif'd additional on the gronrnl 
that Barr<->tt was covt•red hy uninsured motorists' cov-
erag-e on his privat<· antomohile insnrancP poli<'y. (R. 8) 
On Decernhf'r 27, 1967, rnorP than om· year snhsP-
q1wnt to the date of tlw aceidPnt, and only aftc-'r dt•nial 
of additional liability hy the 8tatP InsurancP Fund, and 
3 
only after having unavoidably incurred some $1,364.59 
in special damages and lost wages of $1,385.79 (R. 82), 
Barrett settled his claim based upon the uninsured auto-
mobile coverage with State Farm Insurance Company. 
(R. 96) 
The neck injury he sustained being a continuing dis-
ability, Barrett then, on January 22, 1968, applied for 
a hearing to settle the industrial accident claim. (R. 8) 
His application was granted (R. 11), and the hearing 
was held April 10, 1968. (R. 15) 
At the hearing Barrett testified to facts regarding 
his employment which tended to indicate that he was an 
(·mployee of plaintiff South East Furniture. (R. 18 to 23) 
:Mr. Barrett furtlwr testified to the injuries he sustained, 
indicating neck, ehest and arm injuries. (R. 25) The 
reeord shows (R. 26) that Barrett had received no corn-
}>(,rn:;ation from the other d11vf>r for the injuries. (R. 27) 
An insurance policy secured and paid for by him 
(R. 26) included, among other provisions, "Uninsured 
Antomohile Coverage." (R. 89, State Farm :Mutual 
Automofole Policy, at page 5 thereof. CoYerage F.) 
The Referee held the decision of the commission in 
ahPyance pending submission of various do<>nments, in-
eluding hriefs of connsf>l, hut indicated that "the question 
of law should hP resolved primarily," (R. 71), whether 
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the applicant could recover Workmen's Compensation 
benefits in addition to the settlement under the uninsured 
Automobile Coverage. (R. 76, R. 114, R. 127) 
l'"'ollmving submission of Applicant's Brief (R. 75 to 
82) on April 10, 1968, and Defendant's Memorandum 
(R. 113 to 122) on September 24, 1968, the Industrial 
Commission, on June 3, 1969, entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R. 126 to 
129) T1w Commission concluded "that the Applicant 
[was] entitled to he compensated for hi:; losses under 
the eompensation act notwithstanding any s<->ttlement 
reached on the insnranC'P in question." (R. 128) 
Whereupon. this appt>al was takl-'n. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY CON-
CLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
NOTWITHSTANDING ANY CONTRACTUAL RE-
COVERY HE MAY HAVE HAD UNDER THE UNIN-
SURED AUTOMOBILE COVERAGE PROVISION OF 
HIS PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POL-
ICY. 
5 
The plaintiff State Insurance Fund denied liability 
beyond the $617.25 originally allowed Barrett on the 
ground that Barrett's private insurer, State Farm Mu-
tnal, stood in the shoes of the tortf easor whose acts re-
sulted in injury to Barrett. On the basis of this position, 
the plaintiff concluded that State Farm Mutual was a 
third-party within the meaning of 35-1-62, Ptah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and therefore a against whom 
the plaintiffs became trustees of the cause of action. 
Since respondent had previously settled with State Farm 
on the basis of uninsured automobile covt•rage, plaintiff 
Insurance Fund felt that it had bPen thereby fore-
closed from pursuing the action against the thirty party 
tort f Pasor. 
Plaintiff asserts to this court that Section 41-12-21.1 
li.C.A., 1953, as amended, sets forth the ma11datory re-
linirernPnt that all automobile liability policies must con-
tain uninsured motorist coverage. (Plaintiff's Brief at G) 
Plaintiff argnes from that point that Barrett is in no 
(lifferent position, and has obtained no "different type 
of coverage than other drivrrs on onr publie highways." 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 6) Plaintiff's assertion reasonably 
states the correct langnage of the provision - so far as 
it goes. Plaintiff's studied omission of th<' language of 
the last sentence of that section cannot Pscape notice: 
"Tht-> named insnred shall haw the right to 
re jt>ct sneh eovPrage, and unless thP named in-
sured requests snch con•rage in writing, such 
6 
coverage need not be provided in a rene\\ral policy 
or a snpplernent to it the named insured 
had rejected thP coveragt' in connection with a 
policy previously issued to him by the same m-
surer." 4-1-12-21.1 F.C.A., 195i1 as anwnded. 
Read with the preceding portion of the stat<-'ment, 
tl1is sentence clearly renders the requireHwnt of uninsured 
motorist coverage permissive - it must be offered, but 
it need not be accepted. In addition, it need not even be-
offered "in a n•newal policy or a suPlilement." l\ilanda-
Barrett frf'ely and rontracted and 
paid for uninsured motorist's rovPrag-e. His rig·hts with 
res1w«t to thP poliey WPl'P er ('111/fratfu. not e.r rlelirto. 
Anotht>r court has eonsidPrPd tlH, legal relation of 
an insnred and insnrt,r insofar as nninsured motorist 
rov<>rage is concPrnPd. 111 Booth r. Fireman·.-: Fiuul 111 . ..;. 
Co., 25:1 La. G:21, 218 So.2d 580, 28 ALR :1d, f>7:1 09()9), 
thr ronrt disrnssed sueh eoverag-<> and its interpretation 
in otlie r jurisdirtions: 
·· ln an pffort to afford protection to tlw inno-
t>Pnt yirtim injm·pd by an nninsm·Pd and finan-
<·ially irrPsponsihle rnotorist, many states havP 
Pnad(-'<l legislation n,qniring· insnrmH'(' eornpc.rni(':-: 
to afford ro\·eraµ;P, fo1· an additional prt>rniurn. 
within tl:P gPnPral antoniohilt> 
policy for to tlw imrnn--d oeeasimwd hy tlw 
nPgligPnc'P of tlw opt>rator of an nninsnred motor 
YPhir\P," 
7 
. jnrisprndence of other states interpret-
mg snmlar statutes and the insurance coverage 
afforded under similar policy provisions has been 
nniform in concluding that the action bv the in-
:mred against his insurer for damages suffered as 
a result of a collision wth an uninsured motorist 
is cotractual ... " (Citing: Hartford Accide·nt & 
Indemnity Co. v. Mason, 210 8o.2d 475 (Fla.); 
8chleif v. Hardware Dealer's Mutual Fire Ins. 
Co., 218 Tn. 489, 404 S.\V.2d 490; DeLw:a L 
Motor V Phicle Arcident lndem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 
7(), 268 NY.8. 2d 289, 215 N.E.2d 482; and less('l' 
rourts in N PW York StatP) 
rrhe con rt sa.id fnrtl!Pl": 
'''Phe· unirnrnred motorist provision closely re-
st'mhlt>s the polici("S of insuranc<' which rPimburse 
nn insured for medical Pxpemws or prope1·ty darn-
ug-P rPsnlting- from an antornohilP a<'rfrlPnt ... 
'l1lie nninsurPd motorist proyision is not ins11ran('P 
or indemnification for the unins!lrPd motorist, and the 
insurer does not stand in the shoes of thf' m1i11su.red 
motorist who is the tort ffr1sor.'' (rrnphasis added) (Cit-
i11g: Nationwide Mntual Ins. Co. \". Harleysyille 
Cas. Co., 125 S.E.2d 840 (\Ta.); J!orn1' r. Superior f,ift' 
fnR. Co., 123 SE2d 401 (\'a.); Drewry r. State Fann Jfltt. 
-:fotomolJile Ins. Co., 12!) H.I!J.2(1 G81 (Ya.); Laird ·v. 
Xatio11wirle [11:;, Co., 134 S.E.2d 20<) (So. C.); Hill I'. 
S<'aboard Fire & Marine [118. Co, 374 8\V.2d fiO() 
Dominici r. Stntr Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 390 
P.2d 806 (Mont.); Ki1:011ar r. Hea/f11, 181 A.:2d G:14 (N.H.) 
8 
Although the Booth case examined the legal status 
of the uninsured motorist coverage for the purpose of 
determining which period of limitation of action applied, 
the cases last cited were noted for their decisions regard-
ing the point in question: whether such coYerage is con-
tractual or otherwise. 
In Commiss£oners of State Ins. Fund v. 1V1£ller, 16() 
777 (N.Y. 1957), 79 ALR 2d 1256, the conrt 
held "that the compensation carrier had no claim against 
the immrance proce-eds nnder a statute giving it a lien 
against recoyeriPs from third persons negligently injur-
ing on employee." The court said the insured did not 
rec.oyer from the tortfoasor hut r<>ceived payment from 
his insurer, whm;e liability was contractual although 
hased in part on the of a third party's tort 
liability. Pointing ont that its right to a lien wonld 
rPmain unimpaired if tlw insnrPr achieYed a 
from the tortf Pasor and that it could pnrsne him if the 
and his insurer failPd to ad, the conrt said 
the compensation carrier was not Pntitled to the benefit 
of any insurance by which thP employee chose to provide 
additional protPction at his own expensP. 
Pf:'terso11 c. State Farm Jlut. Automobile Ins. Co., 
P.2d G51 (On'.) examined among other things, "tlw 
lt>gislati \'e imrpose in creating tompulsory uninsured 
motorist r.overage," as not('d in plaintiffs hrid at pag-P 8. 
(emphasis added) In holding that thP lrnmranee Colll-
missioner had no authority to appron· uninsured motor-
9 
ist coverage provisions which reduced the insurer's lia-
bility by the amount paid to the insured a.s workmen's 
compensation benefits, the· court said: 
"The common law is clear that an injured 
party cannot recover his total damages from each 
of two or more tortf easors. . . . But the common 
law regarding recovery of benefits from more 
than one source, other than the tortf easor, is not 
so clear. In Cary v. Burris [citation omitted], 
we held that the injured plaintiff, a federal em-
ployee whose medical expem;es had been paid by 
the United States Employees' Compensation Com-
mission, could recover these same expenses from 
the defendant tortfeasor. This holding is in acc,-0rd 
wdh the law ·i·n most other Jurisdictfons:· 
Plaintiff's relianc-P on a friendly varagraph torn 
from the context which g-iY(>s it meaning i;.,inorPs thP 
conclm:ion of the court in this case-in-point that an In-
dustrial Commission cannot use nnim•m·Pd motorist c-0v-
erage as an excuse for avoiding or rt>dn<'ing payment of 
workrnt>n 's compensation ht>nefit:-:. 
Plaintiff cites Jones r. Morrison, 284 F. Supp. 1016 
(VV.D. Ark. 1968), as supporting his contrntion that pay-
mt>nt h)r an insnrrr pursuant to uninsun><l motorist cov-
erage is t>quivalent to recovrry against a third-party 
tortfeasor. In fa.ct, the primary issne pr0sented to the 
court was the question of apportionment of liability be-
tween two insurance carriers. The emplo)·ee, \vho was 
admittt>dl "T covered hv his personal policy of insurance; . . 
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was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist 
while driving his employer's car which also v.-as cover('d 
by uninsured motorist coverage. Pursuant to a compara-
tive liability statute, the trial court apportioned liability 
and found ultimately that the employer was entitled to 
$15,000.00 which was to be paid by both insurers. Since 
t•ach carrier had identical provisions limiting recovery 
under the uninsured motorist coverage to $10,000.00, the 
question of apportionment was raised to the appellate 
eourt. The court noted that each policy contai1wd i<lenti-
eal ''other insurance" provisions: 
'"3. Oth('r lrnmranee: \\'ith rPspeet to 
injury to an insured while occupying an antorno-
hile not o"rned hy a nai1wd insured und<•r this 
t>ndorsernent, the- immrance lwn•under shall apply 
·only as exct>ss insnrance OY<·r an>· similar insur-
anc•p an1ilahle to sneh ocC'upant. ... " 
1'he JffOYision contimwd with a statt•ment regarding 
righh; under uninsured motorist con•rage, providing 
generally, that the insurer was liahle only for any lia-
bility in excvss of that amount provided hy tlw limits 
of the "other insurance," including uninsured motorist 
'rhe court cited Appleman, Insurance Law and Prae-
tiee, Yol. 8 Sec. 4914 pp. -1-00-402 for the propo;;ition that 
tlw vehicle owner's in:-;urer is primarily TllP court 
said: 
ll 
"This statement indicates, and the court 
agrees, that, as a general rule, the insurance on 
the vehicle involved is the primary insurance" 
insofar as there is "other insurance." 
* * * 
Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that 
[the employer's] uninsured motorist protection 
should be exhausted, and [the employee's insurer] 
should contribute to that extent necessarv to sat-
isfy the remainder of the judgment the 
nninsnred defendants." 
'I'he court Pxamined an aneillary issue: 
''AnothPr contention which has been advanced 
to the earlier opinion and judgment 
is the statement by [the employer's insurer] in 
its Motion for Apportionment to the effect that 
recovery from the insurance companies by the 
plaintiff should be reduced by . . . the amount 
paid the plaintiff pursuant to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. . . . [The employee's insurer] 
agrees; thP r.ourt, howPvN, does not. 
The policies of both [insurers] provide that 
the uninsured motorist protection shall not inure 
directly or indirectl.v to the be.nefit of any work-
men's compensation or liability benefits 
. . . The rourt iH of the opinion that to giYe any 
effect of this provision would bf' to contravene the 
laws of thP State of A 
Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 81-1340 provides as fol-
lows: 
12 
'Third party liability - (a) Liability un-
affected. (1) The making of a claim for 
compensation against any employee shall not 
affect the right of the employee, or his de-
pendents, to make a claim or maintain an 
action in court against any third party for 
such injury, but the employer or his carrier 
shall be entitled to reasonable notice and 
opportUJnity to join in such action .... ' " (em-
phasis added) 
Comparr thf' Arkansas 8tatutr with Utah's 8tatute: 
''vVhen injury or death for which com-
prnsation is payable under this title shall have 
bee-n caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the 
injured employee, or in casP of death of his d(•-
pendants, may claim compensation and the injured 
t>mployee or his heirs or personal representative 
may have an action for danmges against such 
third iwnmn. If compensation is claimed and thP 
Pmployer or insuranee carrier becomes obligafod 
to pay compensation, the employer or insunrnce 
mrrier shall heconw tnudre of the cause of action 
ag-ainst the third party .... " ( Pmpliasis 
The general intent of the Arkansas statute is not, 
as asserted by plaintiff, is not the same as rtah's statute 
in regarrl to third party actions. 
Utah's legislature has clearly yested an employer or 
insurance carrier with rights snptirior to those of the 
insured by making the compensation carrier trustfe of 
13 
the cause of action. The Arkansas statute is permissive 
in merely entitling the employer or insurance carrier an 
"opportunity to JOm in such action." (Ark. Stat. Ann. 
Sect. 81-1340(a) (1)) 
The Jones rourt went on to say: 
"The judgment for the plaintiff is against the 
third party tortf easors and, because they are un-
insured against the two insurance companies. The 
insurance companies are not tortfeasors." 
12 Couch on Insurance 2d, Sec. 45-650 at p. 585 was 
quoted by the court as saying-: 
"The right of subrogation 'against any other 
party' given an against whom a claim 
has been made under the workmen's compensation 
law does not include the right which an injured 
employee has against the insurer under an unin-
sured motorist provision of a liability policy re-
quired by statute, and in view of the public policy 
and welfare aspects of the workmen's compensa-
tion law the employer's right of subrogation under 
such law against the negligent third party is su-
perior to that of the inslfff•r nnder tlw uninsured 
motorist law." 
The Court noted that the decisions in H orm' i:. Su-
pr?rior Life Ins. Co., 123 S.E. 2d 401 (1962 Va.), and 
Commissioners of Statp, Jn.c;. Fund 1'. Miller, 4 App. DiY. 
2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777, were supportive of the fore-
14 
going statement but felt that "part of the op1ruon [in 
Horne] is in conflict with the applicable provisions of 
the [Arkansas] Workmen's Compensation Act." 
The result of this case was that a \Tirginia decision 
could not be applied to an Arkansas statute to find that 
workmen's compensation payments should be deducted 
from the liability of the carriers of the uninsured motor-
ist covt-ragt>. 
Horne v. Superior Life Ins. Co., supra, is virtually 
on all fours with the instant case. Horne settled with 
hi::; immrPr under the terms of uninsured motorist cov-
erage and subsequently executed a ''Policy Holder's Re-
lease and r11rnst Ag-rt>emnt." Horn<" tlwn filed a claim for 
workmen's compensation whieh was denied on the ground 
that he had destroyed his employer\.; rights of suhrog-a-
tion. The court, at p. 404, met the question head-on: 
"The question arises as to whether the right 
of subrogation 'against any other party' giv0n the 
employer in the [pertinent statute] includes the 
rights that the employee has against the insur0r 
undH thP uninsured motorist )ll"Ovision of a lia-
bility policy whieh is rPquirPd h.\· statnt<>. 
Tlw precise issue is onP of first illlpression. 
It is not the purpose of the uninsured motorist 
law to provide coveragP for tlH· uninsun·d vt>hicle, 
but its object is to afford the insured additio1rnl 
protection in evt>nt of an accident ( Pmphasis 
added). H(•re [the ernployef''s 1nsnrH] does not 
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stand in the shoes of ... the uninsured motorist. 
Its policy does not insure [the uninsured motor-
ist] against liability. It insures Mrs. Horne and 
others protected under the policy against inade-
quate compensation. [The insurer's] liability to 
its insured is contractual, even though it is based 
upon the contingency of a third party's tort lia-
bility, and Horne's employer ... does not become 
a third party beneficiary under the insurance con-
tract. . . . Mrs. Horne chose to provide, at her 
expense, additional protection under the unin-
sured motorist provision for herself and others 
protected thereby [sjc] and not for the [em-
ployer] or its rompensation rarrier." 
Justice Botein concluded similarly, in 
of the Stnte Immrance Fiind r. MillPr, supra., that while 
"the compensation carrier has a right to expert an in-
jured employee to pursue rPmedic>s he may 
have against a third-party tortfeasor, and if the em-
ployee fails to do so, tht> compensation earrier ma.v pro-
tert its lien by pursuing his remedies for him ... it has 
no right to expect an employe<:> to supplement Jijs com-
mon law remedies and protc>rt the compensation rarriers 
lien, by purchasing his own insm'l'tneP." 
This case, like Horne, sitpra, is substantially 
cal to the instant case. Miller claimed \\T orkmen's Com-
pensation benefits and attempted to sue the tortfeasor. 
Upon learning that the tortfeasor was an uninsured 
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motorist, he made a claim against his insurer pursuant 
to uninsured motorist coverage. The State Insurance 
Fund asserted a lien on the proceeds to the extent of the 
compensation benefits paid. 
Meeting the argument of the compensation earner, 
the court said: 
,,rrhe Fund argues that this makes no differ-
ence [that the employee did not recover from the 
tortfeasor, but received payment from his owu 
insurer], that it has a lien on all tort recoverieF;, 
and that the defendant's insurer has agreed to 
stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor. Defendant's 
insurer cannot, however, be deemed the alter-fgo 
of the tort-feasor. It does not insure the tort-
f easor agai11st liability; it insures its policy holder 
against the risk of inadequate compensation for 
his c01npe11sable injuries. (emphasis added). Its 
liability to defendant is contractual, although 
premised in part upon the rontingenry of a third 
party's tort liability." 
The Horne and Jl;Jiller cases, supra, deciding the 
exact question which is before this court, have both con-
cluded that an employee can recover ·workmen's compen-
benefits in addition to uninsured motorist cov-
erage benefits; that the benefits from uninsured 
motorist coverage are a contractual obligation of the 
insurer; that the insurer does not stan<l in the shoes of 
the third party tort feasor; that uninsured motorist cov-
Prage does not inure to the benefit of the compensation 
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carrier; that uninsured motorist coverage is contingent 
compensation contracted for and paid by the insured to 
protect himself from the risk of inadequate compensation 
for compensable injuries. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY CON-
CLUDED THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE EXECUTION OF A RE-
LEASE OF CLAIM IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT'S 
INSURER ON THE BASIS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT THEREBY DENIED ITS RIGHT OF RECOV-
ERY AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY. 
8Pction 35-1-fi:Z, F.C.A., 1 provides: 
"When any injury or deatl1 for which corn-
JW·nsation is nndPr this titlf-' shall have 
heen eansed h:' thP l\Tongfnl ad or nt'glect of 
another pen;on not in thP same the 
injured employt'e, or his lwin; or personal repre-
sentative may also have an action for damagPs 
against snch third penmn. If cornpensati011, is 
claimed and the employer or iusurauce carrin· 
becomes ol1ligated to pay compensation., the em-
ployer or insitrance carrier shall bfconu tnistee 
of the crmse of action a.r;ainst tlu third party and 
11iay bring and maintain the action, either in its 
own name or in the name of tht' injured employee 
or his ht'irs or the pt'rsonal rt'presentative of the 
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deceased, provided the employer or carrier may 
not settle and release the cause of action without 
the consent of th0 commission .... " (emphasis 
added) 
This court, per Chief ,Justice Crockett, has recently 
construed this section in Worthen v. Shurtleff and An-
drews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223. Though the 
issue was whether the State Insurance Fund was re-
q nired to bear its proportionate share of expenses in 
an action brought by an injured employee against a third 
party, some general language respPrting the statute is 
not inappropriat0: 
"'l'he hasic pnrpose of this statute is that of 
making an equitable arrangement lwtween an in-
jured ernploye0, and an irnrnrer (or employer) 
\\'ho pays him workmen's compensation, with re-
spect to a rausP of action against a third party 
\\·ho injnres the employee. It presen·es the action 
to the bnt it prevents him from having 
donhle rerovery h>· requiring him to reimburse the 
insnrer. ft also gives the insnrc->r th(' right to 
bring the action, hut allows it onlv to reimhurse 
itself and tlH1n pay any halanre to ·tlw 0mplo!'PP." 
ln this rase, no rerovPry has het>n had against the 
tortfeasor -- in faet, n(litlwr the plaintiff nor 
fh.fendant has hrought suit against the tortfeasor. D('-
frndant, in any <'vent, has assigned his owu rans<' of 
ad ion to his own immranre rarrier. His rarrier, Rtate 
I<"'arrn, now stands in exactly the sanw position as Bar-
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rett stood pnor to the execution of tlw ''Release and 
rrrnst Agreement." According to tlw languag-P of lVor-
then, supra, either State Farm or the State Insuranc(• 
Fund, may bring suit against the third party tortfeasor. 
rrhe statnfo might also hf' read morn restrictiyeJy, to 
find that since "the employer or insurance carrier shall 
brcome trnsteP of thr eanse of artion," (emphasis addrd) 
neither the employee nor his assigneP ma>· inde1wndrntly 
maintain an action against the third party, the <-'mployee 
having once claimed workmen's compensation. The prac-
tical result is the same. The State Insurance Fund, in 
this case, has either the sole right to maintain an adion, 
or the right to join in any action against tlw third party 
tort fpasor upon tliP injury to th(' (•mplo>·ee. 
rrhe romt in of State !11.-11rrt•l!Cf Fu11d 
r. Jiiller, supra, arrin•d at the sam<• ronclnsion hased 
upon a statute giving the compemmtion rarrif•r a lien 
on tlw proreeds of an>· re<>oYer>·: 
"In the evPnt that [the Pmployee's] insurer, 
acting in [ tlH• timployee's] nanw nnder thP Trnst 
Agreement ]Jrovisions of the poliry, suhs<='qnentl>' 
achieves a n·eovtiry from th<• tortfc.asor [the cmn-
pensation rights to a cornp('nsation lien 
tlwrtion remain unimpaired. If [ tlw ernplo>·ep's] 
immrer fails to act, the cause of artion against t1w 
tortfeasor passes to [ thP rornpensation carrier] 
opPration of Jm,·. Ahsent any rerov<>ry from 
tlw allegt>d wrongdoer, [ thP compPnsation rarrier] 
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can lmve no lien on the sums received by the 
[employee pursuant to nninsnred motorist cov-
erage-]." 
Plaintiff's assertion that the State Insurance Fund 
js estopped, or foreclosed, or otherwise denied its right 
of suit against the third party tortfeasor "since the 
carrier knows the injured employee has assigned aU 
right ,title and interest to another entity," is plainly 
PIToneons. (emphasis added) N otwi thstandi ng the lan-
guage of the Release and Trnst Agreement that Barrt-tt 
shall "hold in trust for the bem•fit of the company alt 
rights of recovery which he shall havP ... " (R. 9fi), it 
cannot he reasonably prersunwd tl1at a pri ,·ate contrad 
could foreclosP rights statutorily grant.Pd the legis-
lah1r0 of thP stah•. (emphasis add,·d) 
Ha\'ing eDn<'lnded, witlwut support, that defendant 
is attempting to split his <'anse of art.ion, plaintiff doC'u-
ments his position with strong authority. Hespondent 
applauds the effort. In fact, there cannot here, lw a 
splitting of the action. If State Farm s1ws thl' tortfeasor 
upon the basis of its assignment from r0spondent, it 
rnnst reimhnrsP the Htah' InsnrancP Fnnd for \V ork-
men's Com1wnsation payments made to Barrett; if the 
State Insurance Fund SUPS the tortfrasor npon the basis 
of its statutoril>· granted of the camw of 
aetion, it will lw reirnhurs<><l from the proceeds for \Vork-
11wn 's Com1wnsation payrnPnts made to Barrett. If one 
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rnes, the other cannot - bnt in eYPnt, tlH• comrwnsa-
tion carrier will be reimbursed, and th<> tort t'easor will 
bP subjected to onP snit only. 
The horrifying vision of a ''raee to thP courthouse," 
which plaintiff conjures up seems the most of 
events in such cases as these, in view of t1H· fact that 
defendant hPre settled ·with his insurer only after long 
months of studied inaction hy th0 compensation carrier. 
nte: 
POINT III 
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
WAS LAWFUL, PROPER, AND IN ACCORD WITH 
THE FACTS. 
8ection 35-1-20, U.C.A .. 1953, provides that: 
"All orders of the commission within its juris-
diction shall be presumed reasonahle and lawful 
nntil tl1ey are found otherwise in an action brought 
for that purpose, or until altPrP<l or rt·\·oked by 
the commission.'' 
Justice Ellett recently stated tl1e <>ffect of this stat-
"Our statute provides that findings of fact 
made by the Industrial Commission are 
and final and not subject to rPvi.ew. \Ve have on 
many occasions said that if there is substantial 
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evidence to support the finding, we will not re-
verse. Ill orley v. l11dwdrial Crnnmission. 459 P.2d 
:212 (19o9 Utah). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Industrial 
Commission correctly determined that Barrett was en-
titled to receive \Vorkmen's Compensation benefits as 
well as the proceeds from his contracted-for uninsured 
motorist coverage; that plaintiff's right of subrogation 
against the third-party tortfeasor is superior to that of 
Barrett's insurer; that the Release and Trnst did not 
negate plaintiff's right to bring suit against the third-
party tortfeasor; and that Barrett "is entitled to be 
compensated for his losses unclt•r the compensation act 
notwithstanding any s0ttlrnwnt rearhed on th0 !nnin-
:,;nrNl motorist rovPrage l." 
SUMMERHAYS, KLTNGLE 
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